Meta problem of consciousness solutions. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of " phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness. First-person interventions and the meta-problem of consciousness Colin Klein (The Australian National University) Andrew B. There is no hard problem of consciousness. A particularly strong line holds that a solution to the meta-problem will solve or dissolve the hard problem. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach. Chalmers proposes candidates for an acceptable theory, but I find basic flaws in these. Theories of Consciousness. Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies (symposium on David Chalmers’ “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, ed. The universe is what we know about the universe. François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135. Jan 1, 2021 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. Chalmers’ flirtation with panpsychism is driven by his commitment to taking the problem of consciousness seriously. I want to show that currently available illusionist theories of consciousness neglect this problem, and fail to solve it: they Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self. Dec 29, 2023 · Chalmers has since added to this dichotomy, presenting a third wrinkle a few years later: the meta-problem of consciousness. Like the hard problem, the meta-problem has a long history. The hard problem typic Feb 12, 2019 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view Jan 7, 2022 · PDF | On Jan 7, 2022, Michael Prost published The Meta-Problem of Philosophy and the Solution to the Hard Problem and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness | Find, read and cite all the research you cesses give rise to consciousness. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. Philosopher David Chalmers elucidated the hard problem of consciousness in 1995. For Chalmers, "the easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we think and say there is a hard problem of consciousness. Following Chalmers, I take the most promising response to the meta-problem to be a realizationist one on which (roughly) consciousness plays a role in realizing the processes that explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Chalmers(Journal ofConsciousnessStudies 25:6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant François Kammerer The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people's problem intuitions (i. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem. The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the prob-lem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. Chalmers introduces the 9 problem intuitions by appeal to the verbal reports that ordinary people 10 make about consciousness. AST relates consciousness to attention (Graziano and Kastner 2011; Graziano 2013; Webb and Graziano 2015). It is literally a “tipping point”; and as an abstraction in itself, it cannot be overstated. Solutions to the meta-problem and their limit In "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods. The meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, and solving it is a tractable empirical project for cognitive scientists. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal illusion meta-problem; it is rather to argue carefully for the fact that this problem is a genuine problem for current illusionist theories of consciousness. ), Problem of the Self: Consciousness, Subjectivity, and the Other. Solutions to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness must accept conscious experience as a fundamental non-reducible phenomenon in nature, as Chalmers suggests. 4. François Kammerer) Abstract: The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. We further suggest that the capacity for safe and reliable self-intervention will play a key role in overcoming both the hard and meta-problems of consciousness. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. Neglecting the “meta-problem” can not only obscure the “hard Dec 17, 2019 · The dual theory divides the problem of consciousness into the problem of explaining how the phenomenal character of a mental state is formed, and the problem of consciousness as such. Chalmers has not been Chalmers sees between the hard problem and the meta-problem: ‘Whatever explains consciousness (the hard problem) should also play a central role in explaining our judgments about consciousness (the meta-problem)’ (p. I argue that, in light of the hard problem of consciousness and the possibility of non-temporal causation, self-consciousness could very well be the solution to Leibniz's question. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness is the problem of understanding the universe, reality and consciousness as part of the universe. Meta Problem and Different Perspectives. First, we will show how the relation between problem intuitions and phenomenal consciousness could be understood. It underlies both the hard problem of consciousness and the hard problem of causality. 4 Problems with (Problem) Intuitions The aim of this section is to show that the meta-problem implicitly begs the question. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. Feb 27, 2021 · In our view, solutions to the meta-problem of consciousness are in fact views about the content and reliability of problem intuitions. The meta-problem of consciousness is in principle one of the easy problems, but it bears a special relation to the hard problem, which suggests that finding a solution to it could shed light on the hard problem itself. Philosophers have proposed a wide range of solutions to the hard problem of consciousness, including eliminativism, materialist reductionism, epiphenomenalist dualism, interactionist dualism, and mysterianism. The plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis depends on how exactly one frames the 'problem intuitions' that a solution to the meta-problem must explain. Here I present what I think is the best approach to answer the meta-problem: the evidential approach. 1. Jun 24, 2020 · Chalmers (2018) has recently dubbed this the ‘meta-problem of consciousness'. We are realists about consciousness, like Chalmers. This paper argues that a particular version of the simulation hypothesis is at least as good of a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness as many explanations Chalmers considers, and may even be a better one—as it may be the best solution to a much broader meta-philosophical problem: the ‘meta-problem of everything’, the problem of Mar 7, 2023 · My interest in the scientific study of consciousness was sparked by a paper by Tim Shallice (1972) in which he outlined a possible function for consciousness. For various reasons, many philosophers have not been satisfied with any of these theories of consciousness. One distinguished tradition in- Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. Equivalently, it is the problem of explain-ing why people have problem intuitions: dispositions to make certain key judgments that underlie the problem of consciousness. The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain on the hard problem. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. Chalmers The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. In his paper, titled ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’, published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down… The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather by factors Panpsychism offers an elegant solution: if consciousness is a basic feature of the universe, then its presence in humans and other beings is not so mysterious. 9–10, 2018, pp. Christian Coseru - 2019 - In Manidipa Sen (ed. Barron (Macquarie University) Abstract Chalmers’ (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. Abstract The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. In the remainder of this section we will substantiate these claims, showing more directly the logical interconnectedness between intuitions and consciousness. Aug 14, 2024 · The Hard Problem of Consciousness. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence. May 22, 2020 · Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. ?–? 1 David Papineau 2 Response to Chalmers’ 3 ‘The Meta-Problem 4 of Consciousness’ 5 Abstract: I am glad that David Chalmers has now come round to the 6 view that explaining the ‘problem intuitions’ about consciousness is Do People Think Consciousness Poses a Hard Problem?: Empirical Evidence on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. A solution to the meta-problem could shed Solutions to the hard problem of consciousness. He argues that Pettit and more recently Clark’s “looks as powers” approach to looking red can’t work because the physical property which has the (supposed) power to look red is complex in a way that is not evident in the experience itself. Benjamin W. Namely, there is no way, even in principle, to reduce the qualities of conscious experience to physical entities, which are purely quantitative. Two Caveats to the Meta The plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis depends on how exactly one frames the 'problem intuitions' that a solution to the meta-problem must explain. The Hard Problem of consciousness refers to the vexing challenge of understanding how matter (e. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. Equipped with this distinction, the scientists can narrow the focus of research either into the mechanisms producing phenomenal character or into the processes Mar 14, 2022 · The meta-problem of consciousness challenges theories of mind with a procedure termed the “meta-challenge”: a) Divide the theoretical space into realist and eliminativist theories, and then divide those into those accepting a solution to the meta-problem and those that do not. By contrast, the hard problem and the May 28, 2021 · The road to a possible solution may be paved by means of a new form of cooperation among scientific adversaries. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness is a bit of a controversial subject. 6). 194–204 David Rosenthal Chalmers’ Meta-Problem Abstract: There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions May 20, 2019 · A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. pp. It Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies (symposium on David Chalmers’ “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, ed. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta- Jun 28, 2023 · The meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018) is the problem of explaining the behaviours and verbal reports that we associate with the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness'. Mar 29, 2022 · The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. Feb 15, 2019 · The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we think and say there is a hard problem of consciousness. We are also materialists and naturalists (Barron and Klein, 2016), unlike Chalmers. Illusionism and Meta Ignorance as a Solution to the Meta-Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies (Special issue on Chalmers’s ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’), 27 (5-6):108-119, 2020; Ensemble Representation and the Contents of Visual Experience (co-authored with Tim Bayne), Philosophical Studies, 176:733–753, 2019. Jan 1, 2019 · The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the "hard problem of consciousness" in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles thought experiment raises problems for the consciousness The Hard Problem of Consciousness, as defined by Chalm-ers, holds such sway in the study of consciousness that it is often taken as synonym for “the problem of conscious-ness”, at least for that really interesting kind of conscious-ness: phenomenal consciousness. , phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia). The hard problem typically contrasts The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Problem Intuitions and Potential Solutions. In his paper, titled 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness', published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down a Sep 6, 2016 · The recent paradigm shift in neuroscience, which involves testing competing theoretical frameworks using a combination of neuroimaging techniques and advanced analysis procedures during different conditions, may allow us to find an adequate solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Apr 14, 2022 · David Chalmers The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning Feb 23, 2019 · This paper argues that a particular version of the simulation hypothesis is at least as good of a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness as many explanations Chalmers considers, and may even be a better one — as it may be the best solution to a much broader meta-philosophical problem: the meta-problem of everything, the problem of The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. Testing and Empirical Research. Do People Think Consciousness Poses a Hard Problem?: Empirical Evidence on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. 36). Some philosophers and scientists agree that there is a hard problem and others don’t. Abstract The meta-problem of consciousness is framed as a route into investigating why there are problems in understanding consciousness by describing the mechanisms underpinning our tendency to describe consciousness as problematic, and the evolutionary origins of these mechanisms. Solutions to the meta-problem and their limit In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. Aug 11, 2022 · The goal of the theory is to show that consciousness is a physical phenomenon and that there is a physical solution for the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT). Rodrigo Díaz - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):55-75. Sep 21, 2018 · The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we think and say there is a hard problem of consciousness. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. Behavioral Explanations. e. A far less extravagant option is to endorse the illusionist response and conclude that the meta-problem is not a meta-problem at all but the problem of consciousness. After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and It is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as what it is like to be in a mental state. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. It is simply a matter of complexity and organisation. This is “the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard Jan 3, 2021 · In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. I argue that problem intuitions are hybrid intuitions that encompass one's intuitive take on the phenomenal and one's intuitive take on the physical. Finally, we evaluate current Dec 25, 2019 · This essay is about how to think of the meta problem of consciousenss. Research Program and Illusionism. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various featuresthatgiverisetothe hardproblem. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy pp. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. It examines David Chalmers pro phenomenological formulation and Kieth Frankish's illusionist formulation. Abstract I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. Open Access The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. Championed by Daniel Kahneman in the field of behavioral economics and predated by Arthur Eddington's observational study to test Einstein's theory of general relativity against Newton's theory of gravitation (), adversarial collaboration rests on identifying the most diagnostic Apr 3, 2024 · The conclusion that consciousness intuitions are constructed psychologically further underscores the intimate link between the “hard problem” and the problem of explicating the psychological mechanisms that give rise to intuitions (the “meta-problem” (Chalmers 2018)). A satisfying solution to the hard problem ought to explain why it seemed like there was a hard problem in the first place—why first-order invariants seem arbitrary and inexplicable, even if they are not. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i. At a first pass, we think that the meta-problem arises due to limited access to complex brain states, along with a false belief that The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25, No. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26, No. Apr 6, 2019 · The meta-problem of consciousness is a fulcrum concept. Current Theory of Consciousness Integrated Information. Jan 21, 2022 · The scientific question of consciousness then becomes: what is the real mechanism that gives rise to the self-model on which our belief in a hard problem of consciousness depends? AST is a specific theory that addresses that question. Feb 23, 2019 · This paper argues that a particular version of the simulation hypothesis is at least as good of a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness as many explanations Chalmers considers, and may even be a better one—as it may be the best solution to a much broader meta-philosophical problem: the ‘meta-problem of everything’, the problem of The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience? The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. It The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The most promising solutions to the meta-problem reviewed by Chalmers This work presents and defends a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness, which takes as its starting point the emerging picture of the brain as a hierarchical inference engine and shows why a device, operating under familiar forms of adaptive pressure, may come to represent some of its mid-level inferences as especially certain. Oct 21, 2021 · The real problem is distinct from the hard problem, because it is not— at least not in the first instance— about explaining why and how consciousness is part of the universe in the first place. Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142. intuitions intuitions to respective solutions to the hard (and meta) problem of consciousness. Delhi, India: Aatar Books. Chalmers describes illusionism (Frankish, 2016) as the view that ‘consciousness is or involves a sort of introspective The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. intuitions holding Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26, No. Jun 24, 2020 · Such interventions played a crucial scientific role in untangling other scientific mysteries, and we suggest that the same will be true of consciousness. g. Mar 17, 2017 · The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. At the same time, a solution will almost certainly have consequences for the hard problem of consciousness. One constraint is to explain the intuitions in topic-neutral terms (for example, physical, computational, structural, or evolutionary term) that do not make explicit appeal to consciousness in the explana-tion. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theories, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. Libet - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):33-35. 2 In this article, he made a distinction between low-level competing action systems (automatic processes) and a high-level selector system which coordinates the operations of the low core of what Chalmers calls the meta-problem of consciousness. A weaker line holds that it will not remove the hard problem, but it will constrain the form of a solution. Therefore, the theory of the universe is a theory of consciousness. 6–61 David J. 9–10, 2019, pp. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather by Oct 31, 2019 · Distinguishing the “Easy Part” and the “Hard Part” of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. Oct 21, 2011 · The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i. In the target article, I canvassed about 15 potential solutions to the meta-problem. Add to favourites Favourites: ADD. Challenge from Other Theories. 11-31 for a detailed discussion of this distinction). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. 62-73(12) Author: Diaz-Leon, E. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. 46–64. The meta-problem of consciousness is literally the discrete, binary system of rationality. consciousness may refer to psychological states (cognition or functions); on the other hand, consciousness may refer to phenomenal experience (see Chalmers, 1996, pp. Thus, self-consciousness becomes a possible candidate for being the self-grounding entity that explains existence. Feb 13, 2023 · The meta-problem of consciousness . 1 Strong Illusionism Feb 21, 2017 · Robinson offers a partial defence of the Hard Problem by arguing that a proposed materialist solution to the problem fails. A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. , the human brain) is capable of having subjective experience (Chalmers, 1996; Goff, 2017) – what has historically been known as the mind/body problem. ehwmvg oadz knbyy ajvb emmw xkes csjs gppctbf fiemo xodl